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Ethics

The Demand Letter to Michael Flatley That Became an Extortion Case

Riverdance’s former lead dancer was the target. The California Supreme Court ruled on it in 2006, and its rules reach every lawyer who represents a survivor.

KC
By Karen Campbell · December 2026 · 12 min read

The letter is addressed to Michael Flatley, one of the best-known names in Irish dance. It reaches his attorney’s desk.

John Brandon is Michael Flatley’s attorney. He will say later that he is not handling the matter. He reads the letter anyway. Parts of it are set in bold, capital letters, underlining and italics, in different sizes, so the eye goes where the writer wants it to go.

It says a woman named Tyna Marie Robertson was raped by Flatley in a Las Vegas hotel suite. It attaches medical records. It claims 40 percent of whatever she recovers. It sets a deadline: Jan. 30, 2003.

Then it says what happens if the deadline passes: a lawsuit, with press releases to media outlets and postings on the internet; an investigation of Flatley’s assets, with the results made public, down to his immigration, Social Security and tax information; and any violation of the law, in the United States or abroad, turned over to the authorities.

It is Jan. 2. The lawyer who wrote it is D. Dean Mauro. He will call in a week.

The people in the letter

Tyna Marie Robertson went to the Las Vegas police on Nov. 14, 2002. Three days later, on Nov. 17, she wrote to them again, asking that the letter be added to the report. She told them she was not ready to give more detail. The court record shows nothing further from her to the police, and no police action. That is all it shows.

This is where every lawyer who takes a case like hers starts. A client has told the police something and then stopped. She has said, in effect, not yet. What does she want from you? What has she already said, and to whom? What happens to her wishes once a letter goes out over your signature?

The man on the other side tells a different story. Michael Flatley is a performer and dance impresario. In his declarations he said the two had dinner at the Venetian and that she came into his bed during the night. He said it was consensual. He said his secretary, in the next room, heard no complaint, and that the next morning Robertson kissed him and said she hoped to see him again. These are his words, from a court filing, and they are his account only. The opinion gives nothing of Robertson’s version beyond the allegation itself.

Then there are the lawyers. D. Dean Mauro, an Illinois attorney who has since retired, wrote the letter. John Brandon, who opened it, told Mauro he was not handling the matter. The lawyer who was is Bertram Fields, and he would soon be on the phone.

Eight days

Mauro did call Brandon, and he repeated the Jan. 30 deadline.

Then the deadline moved toward him. On Jan. 9, Mauro called Brandon again and refused an extension. He said, “I know the tour dates,” and said he would publicize the story wherever Flatley performed.

The next morning, Jan. 10, a message went to Brandon’s secretary: Mauro would go public unless Brandon called back within half an hour. Later that day came a new deadline, 8 p.m. Central, with the news media lined up. Brandon asked about the lien. Mauro told him to just pass on the message.

That same day, Mauro spoke with Fields. By Fields’s account, as the court recorded it, Mauro said he knew how to play hardball, that he would make the story follow Flatley wherever he went, and that he would ruin him. Fields asked the price. Mauro said seven figures.

Fields did two things. He reported the conduct to the FBI, and he asked for more time. Mauro gave one more day. Flatley did not pay.

Mauro then filed suit, saying no settlement could be reached. Robertson later dismissed it voluntarily. A second action was also dismissed, and the court took judicial notice of that.

That could have been the end of it. It began a different case, one about the lawyer. Mauro moved to strike it under California’s anti-SLAPP statute. The trial court denied his motion on Sept. 22, 2003. The Court of Appeal affirmed. On July 27, 2006, the California Supreme Court affirmed too, in Flatley v. Mauro, 39 Cal.4th 299.

The court’s reasoning is short. Extortion needs a threat to accuse or expose, coupled with a demand for money. A lawyer’s involvement does not cleanse a threat that is extortionate. And aggressive negotiation, the court said, is not necessarily extortion. It limited its holding to the facts in front of it: a letter, a string of calls, shrinking deadlines, a number with seven figures, and a promise to make the story follow the man from city to city.

The price, for the record, was at least $1 million.

A smaller letter, the same rule

If you think Flatley is the extreme case, the kind of letter no careful lawyer would write, look at Los Angeles.

Miguel Mendoza managed Media Print & Copy, a print and copy business. A lawyer, Reed Hamzeh, represented Guy Chow, and his letter said he had been retained to represent the business. On May 6, 2009, Hamzeh sent Mendoza a letter. It claimed damages of more than $75,000 and demanded repayment and cooperation. It said Hamzeh would sue. It also said he would report Mendoza to the California Attorney General, the Los Angeles District Attorney, the IRS for tax fraud, and the Better Business Bureau, and that he would tell customers and vendors.

Mendoza v. Hamzeh was a business dispute: a manager, an owner and a claim about money. There is no deadline that moves by the hour, no tour dates, no seven figures.

Mendoza sued in May 2011. Hamzeh moved to strike. The trial court denied the motion and awarded Mendoza $3,150 in fees. On April 22, 2013, the Court of Appeal affirmed, in Mendoza v. Hamzeh, 215 Cal.App.4th 799. The letter was extortion as a matter of law. It did not matter whether Mendoza had done something wrong or owed the money. It did not matter that the letter named no specific crimes. The court acknowledged that Hamzeh’s conduct was less egregious than Mauro’s, and then said the rule applies anyway.

The rule applies to ordinary letters too, including one that looks like every other demand you have written.

What the ethics rules say

The ABA Model Rules do not forbid the threat. The old Model Code had a provision on it, DR 7-105. The drafters of the Model Rules left it out on purpose, and ABA Formal Opinion 92-363 explains that other rules still reach abusive threats: 8.4(b) on criminal conduct, 4.1 on truthfulness, 4.4 on respect for third persons, and 3.1 on meritorious claims.

The answer depends on where you practice.

StateRuleWhat it says
CaliforniaRule 3.10A lawyer shall not threaten to present criminal, administrative or disciplinary charges to obtain an advantage in a civil dispute. You may tell the other side that conduct will be reported if it continues. You may not state or imply that you will pursue it unless the other side settles. The rule does not bar a threat of a civil suit, and it does not bar actually presenting the charges.
TexasRule 4.04(b)(1)Reaches a threat made “solely to gain an advantage in a civil matter.” The arguments will turn on the word “solely.”
IllinoisRule 8.4(g); ISBA Opinion 20-03Three elements: a clear threat, communicated to the target, with a clear link to a civil benefit. A letter may state the law and mention possible criminal liability. It may not offer to withhold prosecution for payment.
WisconsinEthics Opinion EF-21-01Permits the threat if the lawyer has a good-faith belief in both the civil claim and the criminal charge, and the criminal matter is related to the civil one.

Read the table side by side. A threat that Wisconsin allows with the right good-faith belief, California bars outright when it is tied to settlement. Check your own state’s rule before you write the sentence, not after.

What the client decides

A survivor who comes to a plaintiff’s lawyer is rarely asking for one thing. She may want the person held accountable in the criminal system. She may want money, and she may want it for reasons that have nothing to do with greed: therapy, lost work, a way to leave a town. She may want a public record. She may want none of these, or all of them, and may not know which until she has been in the room a few times. Robertson, in the one place the record lets us see her, told the police she was not ready to say more.

Model Rule 1.2(a) is plain about whose decision this is. The client decides whether to settle. The lawyer’s sense of leverage does not.

That is the question behind every letter like Mauro’s. Did the client choose the criminal track as a lever? Does she understand that a threat tied to a payment can be extortion, and that the lawyer who sends it can end up as the defendant, as Mauro and Hamzeh did? Has she been told that the criminal case is not the lawyer’s to trade? Ask her these before anyone writes the letter.

Tell the client both things plainly, before the first deposition: her pain is real, and her options come with rules.

Her name and her history

If the case survives the letter, it reaches a judge, and the first fights are about what the jury, and the public, will learn about her.

Her name. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 10(a) says a complaint names the parties. Courts let plaintiffs use a pseudonym in some cases, and each circuit applies its own test. The Third Circuit’s Doe v. Megless (2011) weighs six factors favoring anonymity against three disfavoring it. The Fourth Circuit’s James v. Jacobson (1993) uses five factors and treats anonymity as an exception.

Both tests balance several factors, so the answer depends on the facts and on the judge. In Doe v. Court of Common Pleas of Butler County (W.D. Pa. Nov. 3, 2017), Judge Cathy Bissoon denied an adult plaintiff’s motion to proceed under a pseudonym. She wrote that in the vast majority of these cases the plaintiffs file under their own names, and she noted that courts are less inclined to allow it when the alleged victim is not a minor.

There is no single rule. Talk to your client about her name before you file, not after the ruling.

Her history. Federal Rule of Evidence 412 makes evidence of a victim’s sexual behavior or predisposition generally inadmissible in civil cases. The exception is demanding: the evidence’s probative value must substantially outweigh the harm to the victim and the prejudice to any party. That reverses the usual Rule 403 balance, which favors admission unless prejudice substantially outweighs value. Rule 412 protects the client only if the lawyer raises it in time.

When there are many clients

Everything so far assumed one client. Many cases have more.

A hypothetical, and only that. A lawyer represents ten people who say they were assaulted by the same person. The defendant’s insurer offers a single sum for all ten. The lawyer has a view about how to split it. Two of the clients want to take the offer. Eight do not.

Model Rule 1.8(g) governs that moment. A lawyer who represents two or more clients may not take part in an aggregate settlement unless each client gives informed consent in a writing signed by the client, or a court approves it. ABA Formal Opinion 06-438 says what informed means: each client has to be told the total, each client’s share, the fees and costs, and how the money is apportioned. It also says advance consent cannot be informed, so a retainer clause that says the group can settle by majority vote will not do the job.

The D.C. Bar reached the same place in Ethics Opinion 386 in 2023: each client’s right is absolute, and a majority-rules or committee-decides structure is impermissible.

So in the hypothetical, the two who want out do not decide for the eight. The eight do not decide for the two. Each one signs, or the deal is not done.

Fees come out of the same recovery, so each client should see the numbers in writing before she signs.

Talking to the press

Your client wants to be heard, and reporters are calling. Why not talk to them?

Dominic Gentile is the cautionary tale. He was a Las Vegas criminal defense lawyer. His client, Grady Sanders, owned a safe deposit vault business, and he was indicted for allegedly taking cocaine and traveler’s checks from the boxes. About six months before trial, Gentile held a press conference. He said his client was innocent, that a police detective was the likely culprit, and that his client was a scapegoat. The client was acquitted on all counts. The State Bar disciplined Gentile anyway, under a Nevada rule modeled on Model Rule 3.6.

In Gentile v. State Bar of Nevada (1991), the U.S. Supreme Court held that the substantial-likelihood standard satisfies the First Amendment. But a different majority found the Nevada rule void for vagueness as applied to Gentile, because he had relied on its safe harbor. The Court wrote that the rule “creates a trap for the wary as well as the unwary.” Gentile said he held the conference to counter publicity he feared would poison the jury pool and to protect his client’s reputation.

The lesson for a plaintiff’s lawyer is not that you must stay silent. It is that you read your state’s rule, and plan what you will say, before the first reporter calls.

The survivor’s version of this is harder. A press release can feel like a victory to a client who has been ignored. It can also become the exhibit in the defendant’s motion. And a confidentiality clause in the settlement can feel like the end of her voice. The Speak Out Act, signed Dec. 7, 2022, makes pre-dispute nondisclosure and non-disparagement agreements unenforceable in these cases. It does not bar them at the settlement stage. What your client signs then is her choice, and yours to explain.

Before you send the letter

  1. Read your state’s rule on threats in civil demands before you write the first sentence.
  2. Keep the civil claim and the criminal complaint apart. The criminal case is not yours to trade.
  3. Ask your client what she wants, and tell her the risks, in a conversation before any letter goes out.
  4. Talk to her about her name before you file.
  5. In a matter with more than one client, get each client’s informed consent in a signed writing.
  6. Study the press rule and plan before you speak.

This story is for lawyers. It is not legal advice.

Sources

Court opinions: Flatley v. Mauro, 39 Cal.4th 299 (2006); Mendoza v. Hamzeh, 215 Cal.App.4th 799 (2013); Gentile v. State Bar of Nevada, 501 U.S. 1030 (1991); Doe v. Court of Common Pleas of Butler County (W.D. Pa. Nov. 3, 2017); Doe v. Megless, 654 F.3d 404 (3d Cir. 2011); James v. Jacobson, 6 F.3d 233 (4th Cir. 1993).

Rules and opinions: California Rule 3.10; Texas Rule 4.04(b)(1); ISBA Opinion 20-03 (Illinois Rule 8.4(g)); Wisconsin Ethics Opinion EF-21-01; D.C. Bar Ethics Opinion 386; Federal Rule of Evidence 412; ABA Model Rules 1.2(a), 1.8(g), 3.1, 3.6, 4.1, 4.4 and 8.4(b); ABA Formal Opinions 92-363 and 06-438; Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 10(a); Federal Rule of Evidence 403. Statute: Speak Out Act (Dec. 7, 2022), summary by Sullivan & Cromwell.

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